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WHAT IS SECURITIZATION? AND FOR 
WHAT PURPOSE? 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ* 
In Re: Defining Securitization,1 Professor Jonathan Lipson attempts to 
define a ―true‖ securitization transaction,2 ultimately characterizing it as ―a 
purchase of primary payment rights by a special purpose entity that 
(1) legally isolates such payment rights from a bankruptcy (or similar 
insolvency) estate of the originator, and (2) results, directly or indirectly, in 
the issuance of securities whose value is determined by the payment rights 
so purchased.‖3 There is much to admire in Lipson‘s attempt but also much 
to question.  
Let me start with the admiration. Lipson‘s article is by far the most 
systematic and thoughtful analysis of what securitization should mean. 
Importantly, he describes what he sees as the ―essential elements of a 
securitization, its inputs (payment rights), structure (bankruptcy-proof legal 
isolation), and outputs (securities).‖4  
Dividing securitization into inputs, structure, and outputs is 
rhetorically, if not also conceptually, sensible. Indeed, in teaching courses 
about securitization I often have referred to the left-hand side of the 
structure—which Lipson more felicitously calls the inputs—and the right-
hand side of the structure—which Lipson (again more felicitously) calls the 
outputs. To the extent such terminology is intuitively descriptive, it 
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George Christie, Edward M. Iacobucci, and Jason H.P. Kravitt for excellent comments and Arie 
Eernisse for valuable research assistance. 
 1. Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229 (2012). 
 2. See id. at 1233 (distinguishing ―true securitizations from other transactions that may satisfy 
existing definitions and understandings, but which flunk the definition advanced‖ in his article). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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advances understanding. In future courses, I intend to refer to inputs and 
outputs. I would, however, make one change to Lipson‘s use of the term 
―structure‖ to describe the portion of a securitization transaction between 
the inputs and the outputs. Because ―structure‖ intuitively means an entire 
structure—which, in the case of securitization, would also include the 
inputs and outputs—I suggest using the term ―intermediate structure‖ 
instead. Thus, I will refer to a securitization transaction‘s inputs, 
intermediate structure, and outputs. 
Even with that change, I still have several concerns with Professor 
Lipson‘s definition of securitization. This Article will next discuss those 
concerns, showing that the definition is overly restrictive and potentially 
inaccurate. The Article then will engage Lipson‘s article to explore, more 
normatively, how a financial concept should be defined in light of 
dynamically changing financial markets and the different perspectives of 
policymakers and lawmakers, market participants and their lawyers, judges 
and regulators, and other parties (including the media and the public) 
interested in or impacted by the definition (all such parties hereinafter 
referred to as the ―audience‖ for the definition).   
I.  ASSESSING PROFESSOR LIPSON‘S DEFINITION 
I next use the modified version of Professor Lipson‘s helpful 
categories—inputs, intermediate structure, and outputs—to assess his 
definition of securitization.5 
A.  INPUTS 
Lipson‘s definition is overly restrictive insofar as it limits inputs to 
―primary‖ payment rights. He explains that he imposes this limitation 
because of the possibility that reliance on nonprimary payments rights 
―masked the weaknesses‖ of transactions that relied on such rights.6 Thus, 
he argues that collateralized debt obligations (―CDOs‖) were not true 
securitizations because they ―often have relied not on ‗primary payment 
rights‘ . . . but instead on more opaque ‗financial assets‘ that may have 
masked the weaknesses of these transactions.‖7 He also argues that 
 
 5. Recall that he defines securitization as ―a purchase of primary payment rights by a special 
purpose entity that (1) legally isolates such payment rights from a bankruptcy (or similar insolvency) 
estate of the originator, and (2) results, directly or indirectly, in the issuance of securities whose value is 
determined by the payment rights so purchased.‖ Id. 
 6. Id. at 1234 
 7. Id.  
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―Enron‘s structured financings‖ were not true securitizations because, as 
with CDOs, they did not rely on primary payment rights.8 
The implicit rationale of Lipson‘s limitation is that primary payment 
rights are inherently stronger than nonprimary payment rights. But he does 
not explain why relative weakness should be a normative basis for 
definitional distinctions. I engage that question below.9 Nor does Lipson 
explain why primary payment rights are inherently stronger than 
nonprimary payment rights. I believe they are not always stronger. For 
example, nonprimary payment rights can include rights, such as guarantees 
from creditworthy third parties and two-party paper like bankers 
acceptances,10 that are much stronger than the underlying primary payment 
rights. And some primary payment rights, such as mortgage payments due 
on subprime mortgages, are very weak indeed.  
Moreover, I question Lipson‘s examples of CDOs and Enron‘s 
structured financings as being distinct from securitization because they did 
not rely on primary payment rights and thus had weaknesses. CDO 
transactions had weaknesses not because they relied, per se, on nonprimary 
payment rights but, instead, because the outputs of some highly leveraged 
CDO transactions—usually referred to as ABS CDO transactions—
consisted of tranches of securities whose repayment was extremely 
sensitive to cash-flow variations.11 When the cash-flow assumptions turned 
out to be wrong, many of these tranches defaulted or were downgraded.12  
Similarly, Enron‘s structured financings had weaknesses not because 
they relied, per se, on nonprimary payment rights. The weaknesses 
resulted, instead, from Enron assuming that there was little, if any, 
correlation between the value of merchant assets being guaranteed in those 
transactions and the price of Enron stock supporting those guarantees.13 
When the stock price and merchant-asset value coincidentally fell, those 
 
 8. Id. 1271–72. 
 9. See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 10. A banker‘s acceptance is a draft signed by a commercial party, such as an exporter of goods, 
and accepted by that party‘s bank. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK 
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 491 n.18 (2001) (quoting United States v. 
Dougherty, 763 F.2d 970, 971 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985)). Such acceptance turns the draft into ―a secure, no-
risk investment due to the bank‘s absolute obligation to pay upon [the draft‘s] maturity, regardless of 
the [party‘s] ability to pay . . . .‖ Id. at 492. 
 11. For descriptions of these types of transactions see infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 37–44. 
 13. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1359 (2011). 
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transactions failed, causing Enron‘s collapse.14 Nor is Lipson‘s distinction 
between primary and nonprimary payment rights necessary for 
distinguishing Enron‘s structured financing transactions from 
securitization; there were so many basic distinctions between them that 
few, if any, market participants regarded those transactions as 
securitizations.15  
In any event, Lipson‘s attempt to limit securitization‘s inputs to only 
strong rights raises the same normative question indicated above.16  
B.  INTERMEDIATE STRUCTURE 
Professor Lipson‘s characterization of the intermediate structure of 
securitization is overly restrictive because it excludes certain transactions 
commonly regarded by market participants as securitizations. For example, 
he requires legal isolation of the repayment source from a bankruptcy (or 
similar insolvency) estate of the originator.17 When the originator is of 
investment-grade quality, however, many securitization transactions do not 
necessarily achieve such legal isolation.18  
Excluding from a definition transactions commonly regarded by 
market participants as part of that definition raises a normative question: 
Should the definition of a type of observed event exclude events that third-
party observers generally would expect to be of that type? A definition 
should help to clarify discussions, but one that runs counter to common 
understandings may be confusing.19 It appears, however, that Lipson might 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1574 (2004) 
(explaining that securitization transactions, unlike Enron‘s transactions, ―unambiguously transfer[] risk 
from the company to third parties‖ and generally do not involve material conflicts of interest). 
 16. See supra text accompanying notes 9–10. 
 17. Lipson, supra note 1, at 1233. 
 18. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 142 
(1994) (―If the originator‘s rating is investment grade, it often can structure the transfer of receivables to 
the SPV as a sale for accounting but not necessarily bankruptcy purposes.‖). Subsequent to that 
observation, the Financial Accounting Standards Board promulgated Financial Accounting Standard 
(―FAS‖) 140, which required legal isolation as a condition for accounting-sale treatment. FIN. 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 140, at 70–
72 (2000), available at http://fasb.org/pdf/fas140.pdf. FAS 140 was eventually amended, however, and 
(at least since a 2005 SEC Staff Report criticizing off-balance-sheet financing) many securitization 
deals no longer even purport to be accounting sales. MAYER BROWN, BIG CHANGES TO 
SECURITIZATION ACCOUNTING 1 (2009), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/ 
fab3ec91-d064-4740-89b2-a9c42d373dc1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6a14e039-2b95-4246-
85b8-bde2733bb7fb/UPDATE_Securitization_FASB_0609_V2.pdf. 
 19. See infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. Although in some situations definitions can 
and should strive to change expectations, such motivations can be counteracted by the confusion and 
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not intend his exclusion. As I later discuss, he argues that in commercial 
finance law, one should look closely and critically at what actually happens 
in the real world.20  
Professor Lipson‘s characterization of the intermediate structure of 
securitization also inverts cause-and-effect. He states that the purchase of 
the repayment source ―results . . . in the issuance of securities.‖21 If 
anything, the causation is the reverse; it is the issuance of securities that 
provides the cash proceeds that are used to purchase the repayment source.  
C.  OUTPUTS 
Finally, Professor Lipson‘s characterization of the outputs is 
potentially inaccurate insofar as it requires the ―value‖ of the securities to 
be ―determined‖ by the source of payment.22 The source of payment, 
however, merely determines the likelihood that the securities will be repaid 
on a timely basis, whereas the ―value‖ of securities depends not merely on 
their likelihood of timely repayment but also on their interest rate (or rate 
of return). For example, securities that have the same likelihood of timely 
repayment are more valuable, other things being equal, if they bear a higher 
interest rate than if they bear a lower interest rate. Because the rate of 
return is market driven and extraneous to securitization per se, a more 
accurate characterization of the outputs would state that collections on the 
payment rights purchased are the primary source of repayment of the 
securities.23  
 
II.  HOW SHOULD A CONCEPT LIKE SECURITIZATION BE 
DEFINED? 
This Part II explores, more normatively, how securitization, a 
financial concept, should be defined. The primary focus of this inquiry is 
legal: to define securitization for regulatory purposes. In that inquiry, I 
 
misunderstanding created by an exclusionary or underinclusive definition. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 29–32. 
 21. See Lipson, supra note 1, at 1233. 
 22. See id. 
 23. In some securitization transactions, the payment rights and / or expectations are merely the 
primary, as opposed to the sole, source of repayment. See Exclusion from the Definition of Investment 
Company for Structured Financings, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,105, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,248-
01 (proposed Nov. 27, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (2011)). 
DO NOT DELETE  12/20/2012  4:36 PM 
1288 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1283 
 
recognize ―the lack of an agreed upon methodology on how to . . . define 
legal concepts.‖24  
A.  THE DEFINITION SHOULD BE PRAGMATIC 
As a starting point, I believe that even a normative approach to 
defining a financial concept, such as securitization, should be pragmatic, 
taking into account how the concept is used in the real world. Defining a 
concept in a new way ―may cause misunderstanding and unwanted 
interpretations.‖25 Thus, ―[i]f all concerned people understand concepts A, 
B and C in a specific way due to their foundation in . . . common practice, 
it is preferable to use them rather than the more abstract concept of D that 
contains A, B and C.‖26  
Such a pragmatic definition of securitization could be articulated as 
follows: A financial transaction in which (1) a special purpose entity issues 
securities to investors and, directly or indirectly, uses the proceeds to 
purchase rights to, or expectations of, payment, and (2) collections on the 
rights or expectations so purchased constitute the primary source of 
repayment of those securities. 
Professor Lipson‘s approach to defining securitization, even though 
normative,27 is also pragmatic.28 Inspired by Karl Llewellyn‘s commercial 
law realism, reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code, Lipson argues that 
―[w]hat participants in the legal system and the market actually do should 
influence, if not determine, how the law works and speaks.‖29 From this, 
Lipson advances a ―grounded method of finding meaning in commercial 
finance law‖ to ―look closely and critically at what actually happens in the 
real world.‖30  
I have already shown, however, that Lipson‘s definition of 
securitization only imperfectly reflects its real world definition.31 If Lipson 
 
 24. Lorenz Kahler, The Influence of Normative Reasons on the Formation of Legal Concepts, in 
88 CONCEPTS IN LAW 81, 90 (Jaap C. Hage & Dietmar von der Pfordten eds., 2009) (citing D. 
Patterson, Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 552, 
553 (2006)). 
 25. Id. at 86. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Lipson, supra note 1, at 1235 (offering his definition ―as a tool to organize the process of 
thinking about what securitization means, normatively‖). 
 28. Id. at 1236 (stating that he is attempting to define securitization for ―more pragmatic 
purposes‖ than epistemology).  
 29. Id. at 1237. 
 30. Id.  
 31. See supra Part I. 
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agrees with my observations of how his definition imperfectly reflects 
reality, presumably he would agree with my conforming changes to that 
definition.32  
By limiting the definition of securitization to transactions that are paid 
from primary payment rights,33 Lipson‘s definitional approach also 
implicitly raises a normative question: Should the definition of 
securitization exclude securitization‘s weaknesses? Other than to improve 
how securitization is viewed, I see no reason why the definition of 
securitization should necessarily exclude securitization‘s weaknesses. To 
the contrary, I see several reasons why weaknesses should not be excluded.  
First, to the extent the definition should reflect how securitization is 
used in the real world—and Lipson and I both agree it should34—the 
definition should include weaknesses in that actual use. Second, and more 
significantly, defining securitization to include its potential weaknesses 
could have a positive social impact by inviting regulation to limit those 
weaknesses, whereas defining securitization to exclude potential 
weaknesses could mislead policymakers and lawmakers. Indeed, a 
normative definition should strive to achieve an optimal regulatory or other 
clarifying purpose,35 otherwise the definition is merely an academic 
exercise.  
There is also a more pragmatic reason why the definition of 
securitization should not exclude securitization‘s weaknesses: it is difficult 
to categorically assess securitization‘s strengths and weaknesses.36 Recall 
that I have questioned whether Lipson‘s distinction between primary and 
nonprimary payment rights necessarily reflects a distinction between 
strength and weakness.37  
 
 32. Those changes include recognizing that many securitization transactions involving 
investment-grade originators do not necessarily achieve legal isolation, clarifying cause-and-effect to 
explain that it is the issuance of securities that provides the cash proceeds that are used to purchase the 
repayment source, and clarifying that collections on the rights or expectations purchased do not 
independently determine the value of the securities.  
 33. See supra Part I.A. On a more technical, nonnormative level, I disagree with Lipson‘s 
observation that weakness necessarily turns on the distinction between primary and nonprimary 
payment rights. See Lipson, supra note 1, at 1233–34. 
 34. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 35. See generally Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to 
Approach the Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705 (2008) (exploring 
how the financial concept of a ―credit event‖ should be interpreted for purposes of improving regulation 
of swap agreements). 
 36. Kahler, supra note 24, at 85 (questioning whether legal definitions should use evaluative 
criteria). 
 37. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, Lipson himself does not pursue the logic of his distinction, 
applying it solely to inputs (payment rights) and not to outputs 
(securities).38 The output side of securitization often consists of multiple, 
sometimes numerous, classes (or ―tranches‖) of securities, each class 
having relative priority of repayment compared to other classes and, in 
certain cases, being repayable from specific cash flows (such as interest-
only or principal-only securities).39 This type of tranching can create 
weaknesses. For example, the more highly rated tranches are leveraged on 
the more subordinated tranches, which are relatively small and thus 
sensitive to cash-flow variations.40 Tranching also can create weaknesses 
by creating conflicts of interests for servicers of the underlying financial 
assets—such as where a servicer cannot feasibly restructure the terms of an 
underlying loan because reducing interest would prejudice holders of 
interest-only securities but reducing principal would prejudice holders of 
principal-only securities.41  
B.  THE DEFINITION SHOULD RECOGNIZE AUDIENCE PERSPECTIVES 
Lipson recognizes the importance of at least one audience group, 
lawmakers, observing that because ―securitization is likely here to stay[,] 
[t]he important question will then be how to regulate it.‖42 In order to do 
that, another ―important question will be how to define it.‖43 Lawmakers, 
however, are not the only members of the audience. In order to define 
securitization, one should take into account the perspectives of all audience 
groups affected by the definition.  
I next examine the perspectives of four audience groups: policymakers 
and lawmakers; transactional lawyers and their clients—the market 
participants; judges and regulators; and the media and public. Definitions 
provide value to the extent they enable audience members to focus on 
characteristics relevant to them.  
 
 38. Lipson, supra note 1, at 1233. 
 39. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 377–78 (2008). 
 40. FRANK J. FABOZZI, FIXED INCOME ANALYSIS 327 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining that asset 
managers must satisfy certain principal repayment tests for tranches in a CDO to maintain credit ratings 
for the senior and mezzanine tranches and that the unrated subordinate or equity tranche merely 
receives the residual cash flow); Michael S. Gibson, Understanding the Risk of Synthetic CDOs 25–26 
(Fed. Reserve Bd., FEDS Working Paper No. 2004–36, 2004), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200436/200436pap.pdf. 
 41. Schwarcz, supra note 39, at 393. 
 42.  Lipson, supra note 1, at 1255. 
 43. Id. 
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1.  Policymakers and Lawmakers 
Policymakers, who often include lawmakers, need to understand what 
it is about securitization that could create externalities so they can examine 
whether society should require those externalities to be internalized. This 
requires a broad definition of securitization,44 and certainly not one that 
limits the term to only those manifestations of securitization that are 
―relatively benign.‖45 For this reason and others, I oppose a definition that 
would leave out securitization‘s potential weaknesses.46  
Once policymakers determine which externalities should be 
internalized, lawmakers need to define securitization for regulatory 
purposes, in a way that at least captures those potential externalities. An 
underinclusive definition can lead to an inadequate regulatory response.47 
Lawmakers also need that definition to be simultaneously broad enough so 
that market participants cannot find regulatory loopholes and sufficiently 
clear and precise to preserve the definitional clarity needed to enforce the 
law and minimize the intended externalities.48  
2.  Transactional Lawyers and Their Clients, the Market Participants 
Transactional lawyers and their clients—the market participants—
need to be able to determine from the definition whether the clients are 
subject to regulation incorporating that definition. From that perspective, 
the definition should not be overly broad.49 Moreover, the definition ideally 
 
 44. This definition is not yet, technically, a legal definition but rather an ex ante working concept 
of what securitization encompasses. 
 45. See Lipson, supra note 1, at 1275. 
 46. See supra notes 33–41 and accompanying text. 
 47. Cf. Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 1, 10–12 (2011) (arguing that the underinclusiveness of common definitions of financial derivatives 
leads to an inadequate regulatory response). 
 48. This tension is sometimes expressed as the tension between principles and rules. Although 
the principles-rules dichotomy has been much discussed in the context of financial regulation, 
commentators are often imprecise in distinguishing principles from rules. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A 
Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities 
Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1420–22 (2007) (observing that the exact manner 
of classifying provisions of law as principles or rules is contested). 
 49. The expansive definition of ―securities,‖ for example, has prompted concern whether 
particular types of investments can be classified as securities and regulated as such. See Bradley D. 
Johnson, Note, Discretionary Commodity Accounts as Securities: An Application of the Howey Test, 53 
FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 641 (1984) (examining whether the broad legal definition of ―securities‖ 
includes discretionary commodity accounts); George A. Burke, Jr., Limited Liability Companies and the 
Federal Securities Laws: Congress Should Amend the Securities Laws to Avoid Coverage, 76 IND. L.J. 
749, 750 (2001) (examining whether the broad legal definition of ―securities‖ includes limited liability 
company (―LLC‖) interests). 
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should be consistent with market expectations, which help to signal 
whether market participants might be subject to the regulation.50  
Market participants, in my experience, currently view one if not two, 
and possibly as many as three, types of transactions as securitizations. The 
first such type is obvious: a basic securitization transaction in which a 
special purpose entity (―SPE‖) issues mortgage-backed securities 
(―MBSs‖) or asset-backed securities (―ABSs‖).51 MBSs are securities 
whose payment derives principally or entirely from mortgage loans owned 
by the SPE.52 ABSs are securities whose payment derives principally or 
entirely from financial assets, other than mortgage loans, owned by the 
SPE.53 It is generally agreed that market participants regard this basic 
transaction as securitization.54 
Market participants also often regard CDO transactions as 
securitizations.55 CDO securities are backed by—and thus their payment 
derives principally or entirely from—a mixed pool of mortgage loans 
and/or other financial assets owned by an SPE.56 Fewer market 
participants, however, regard ABS CDO transactions as securitizations. 
These transactions, often referred to as ―re-securitization,‖ are backed by a 
mixed pool of ABS and/or MBS securities owned by the SPE, and thus 
their payment derives principally or entirely from the underlying mortgage 
loans and/or other financial assets ultimately backing those ABS and MBS 
securities.57  
The definition of securitization should therefore include basic 
securitization transactions and CDO transactions and might also include 
ABS CDO transactions. Schematically, the distinctions among these types 
of transactions can be portrayed as follows:58 
FIGURE.  
 
 50. I recognize, of course, that the definition itself can change those expectations. 
 51. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT TERMS 35, 630 (7th ed. 2006) (defining securitization). 
 52. Id. at 434–35. 
 53. Id. at 35. 
 54. Id. at 630. 
 55. See, e.g., INT‘L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: NAVIGATING 
THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AHEAD 81 (2009) (referring to CDOs as a subset of securitization). Cf. 
supra note 11–12 and accompanying text (discussing CDO transactions, which Professor Lipson does 
not regard as securitizations). 
 56. DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 51, at 121. 
 57. Schwarcz, supra note 39, at 376–77.  
 58. Id. at 377.  
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3.  Judges and Regulators 
Judges and regulators—the latter term meaning persons interpreting 
and administering the law as opposed to persons making the law (whom I 
call lawmakers59)—need definitional clarity in order to know how to apply 
and enforce the law. Unclear definitions can lead to hard-fought court 
battles over seemingly minor semantic issues.60 Having an easily applied 
definition of securitization may help to avoid courtroom clashes and 
regulatory gridlock. 
I recognize that courts and regulators can themselves refine the legal 
definition of financial concepts.61 But for technical concepts such as 
securitization, this might introduce elements of uncertainty. There should 
be less need for refinement if the definition is clear and straightforward in 
the first place. 
4.  The Media and the Public 
The media needs to define securitization in a way that is both 
descriptive and accessible to the public. This need not be a legal definition. 
But media descriptions of financial concepts, such as securitization, can 
 
 59. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 60. See, e.g., Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass‘n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1968) (interpreting the meaning of language in Uniform Commercial Code § 9–108(a) that requires a 
description of personal or real property that ―reasonably identifies what is described‖). 
 61. As Lipson notes, the U.S. Supreme Court has construed the term ―security‖ broadly to 
include ―countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on 
the promise of profits.‖ Lipson, supra note 1, at 1240  n.40  (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 
551, 555 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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influence lawmakers, in turn influencing how those concepts are legally 
defined.62 Correlatively, legal definitions of financial concepts, such as 
securitization, can influence how the media talks about those concepts.63 
C.  THE DEFINITION SHOULD RECOGNIZE FINANCIAL MARKET EVOLUTION 
Finally, a financial concept, such as securitization, should be defined 
in light of dynamically changing financial markets. Financial concepts, like 
securitization, are not fixed in time; they evolve in response to changing 
financial market conditions. Therefore, the greater its precision, the less 
likely a definition will continue over time to describe a financial concept. It 
therefore appears prudent to strive for a definition of securitization that is 
broad enough to minimize definitional obsolescence. 
III.  DEFINING SECURITIZATION 
Based on the foregoing, how should securitization be defined? I 
originally advanced a pragmatic definition of securitization: A financial 
transaction in which (1) a special purpose entity issues securities to 
investors and, directly or indirectly, uses the proceeds to purchase rights to, 
or expectations of, payment, and (2) collections on the rights or 
expectations so purchased constitute the primary source of repayment of 
those securities.64 How should that definition change in light of the more 
normative considerations of audience perspectives and financial market 
evolution? 
Recall that policymakers need a broad definition of securitization in 
order to understand its externalities and examine which externalities should 
be internalized.65 My pragmatic definition is broad, indeed broad enough to 
encompass all of the types of transactions that arguably could be called 
securitizations. It certainly encompasses basic securitization transactions.66 
 
 62. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, The Upside of Reviving Securitizing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2010, at B1 
(suggesting that regulators should enhance monitoring efforts to ensure that mortgage-backed securities 
are not ―viewed as so safe that investors need not be careful‖); Ken Bensinger, Investors Place Big Bets 
on Buy Here Pay Here Used-Car Dealers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/business/buy-here-pay-here/la-fi-buyhere-payhere-day-two-
20111101,0,2598239,full.story (characterizing ―Buy Here Pay Here‖ auto loan securitization 
transactions as ―subprime mortgages‖ and noting the potential for another financial crisis). 
 63. See, e.g., Nick Timiraos, Global Finance: Securitization Sector Set to Defend Practices at 
Hearing, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2010, at C3 (discussing the legal aspects of securitization in response to 
criticism of mortgage-backed securities). 
 64. See supra Part II.A. 
 65. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 66. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text. 
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It also encompasses CDO transactions because its reference to ―rights to, or 
expectations of, payment‖ would include any mixed pool of mortgage loans 
and/or other financial assets.67 And it additionally encompasses ABS CDO 
transactions because ―rights to, or expectations of, payment‖ would also 
include any mixed pool of ABS and/or MBS securities.68  
Recall also that lawmakers need a broad definition that is 
simultaneously clear and precise enough to preserve the definitional clarity 
needed to enforce the law. The pragmatic definition should be sufficiently 
clear and precise for that purpose because it deconstructs securitization into 
a few simple but distinctive characteristics. By the same token, the 
pragmatic definition should provide sufficient definitional clarity—subject 
to the need for the addition proposed below69—to enable judges and 
regulators to know how to apply and enforce the law. They would only 
have to ask a sequence of easily answerable questions to determine whether 
a given transaction is legally a securitization: Is there an SPE? Does the 
SPE issue securities (a term already defined under securities law)70 to 
investors? Does the SPE use the proceeds to purchase rights to, or 
expectations of, payment? Do collections on the rights or expectations so 
purchased constitute the primary source of repayment of the issued 
securities?71 
Additionally recall that transactional lawyers and their market-
participant clients need to be able to determine from the definition whether 
the clients are subject to regulation. Ideally also, the definition should 
reflect market expectations. The pragmatic definition certainly reflects 
market expectations since it tracks to the types of transactions that market 
participants either generally (in the case of basic transactions), often (in the 
case of CDO transactions), or at least sometimes (in the case of ABS CDO 
transactions) regard as securitizations.72 Furthermore, the pragmatic 
definition‘s clarity and precision, illustrated in the prior paragraph, should 
 
 67. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 69. See infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 70. Although Part II.B.3 recognizes a concern that the term ―securities‖ may be too expansively 
defined for regulatory purposes under securities law, the reference to ―securities‖ in a definition of 
securitization should embrace an expansive definition; it is intended to include any investment interest 
that an SPE issues.  
 71. In practice, however, actual legislation should clarify two aspects of these questions: First 
what is an SPE? Second, what is a purchase? For a discussion of possible clarification choices see 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET 
SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2003) (clarifying in chapter three what should constitute an SPE and clarifying 
in chapter four what should constitute a purchase).   
 72. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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enable transactional lawyers and their clients to determine whether the 
clients are subject to regulation—subject to one exception. The pragmatic 
definition is so broad that it might include investment companies, which 
are SPEs (such as mutual funds) that issue securities to investors and use 
the proceeds to purchase investment securities.73 Investment securities can 
include investments consisting of rights to, or expectations of, payment.74  
The difference between investment-company SPEs and securitization 
SPEs is that the return to investors in the former is based on speculation in 
the rights to and expectations of payment purchased.75 The pragmatic 
definition of securitization therefore should be clarified—at least insofar as 
its audience is lawmakers, transactional lawyers, and market participants—
to avoid any confusion between these SPEs. To that end, I will add to the 
definition of securitization, for purposes of the audience members 
indicated, that the SPE does not speculate in the rights to, or expectations 
of, payment that it purchases.76 This clarification also will help more 
clearly to distinguish securitization from similar structures, such as hedge 
funds and limited purpose joint ventures, which a vaguer definition might 
inadvertently include, as Lipson observes.77  
Recall finally that financial concepts, like securitization, are not fixed 
in time but evolve in response to changing financial market conditions. 
Any definition therefore should strive to minimize definitional 
obsolescence. I believe the pragmatic definition, with or without the 
clarification, should be sufficiently robust for that purpose. Indeed, that 
definition not only would cover the very first securitization transactions to 
be identified as such, which took place in the early 1970s,78 but also would 
 
 73. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a–1 to 80a–64 (2006). See id. § 80a–3 
(defining investment company). 
 74. Id. § 80a–2(a)(36) (defining ―security‖ and including various investment vehicles that 
involve rights to, or expectations of, payment). 
 75. SCHWARCZ, supra note 71, § 6:1.3, at 6–9. 
 76. Cf. Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured Financings, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 19,105, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,248-01 (proposed Nov. 27, 1992) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (2011)). The Act avoids confusion between SPEs engaged in 
securitization transactions and SPEs used as investment companies by requiring that securitization SPEs do 
not acquire or dispose of receivables ―for the primary purpose of recognizing gains or decreasing losses 
resulting from market value changes . . . .‖ 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a–7(a)(3)(iii). 
 77. See Lipson, supra note 1, at 1261–62 (suggesting that the Federal Reserve‘s definition of 
securitization is too vague in this way). 
 78. These transactions involved pools of mortgage loans originated by savings and loan 
associations. These institutions needed to turn their mortgage loans into cash in order to finance local 
housing demands. To achieve this, the Government National Mortgage Association (―Ginnie Mae‖) 
facilitated securitizations through SPEs in the form of trusts that held mortgage-loan pools and issued to 
investors securities in the form of certificates. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 71, § 1:2, at 1–7 to 1–8.  
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cover the most recent transactions identified as securitization.79  
I therefore propose the pragmatic definition as the legal definition of 
securitization,80 clarified as indicated insofar as its audience is lawmakers, 
transactional lawyers, and market participants. That definition, however, is 
probably too abstract and not sufficiently descriptive and accessible to 
serve as a definition for purposes of the media and the public. Nonetheless, 
it could be made more descriptive and accessible by being worded more 
concretely. For example, securitization could be defined for media 
purposes as a transaction in which a special purpose entity, such as a trust, 
(1) issues certificates, promissory notes, or other securities to investors; 
(2) uses the cash received from the investors to purchase mortgage loans or 
other similar assets on which payments are expected to be made; and 
(3) ultimately uses those payments, if and when received, to repay the 
investors. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Lipson‘s article is an excellent and thoughtful inquiry into the 
meaning of securitization. My Article engages Lipson‘s, exploring how 
securitization should be legally defined. As a starting point, even a 
normative approach to defining a financial concept should be pragmatic, 
taking into account how the concept is used in the real world. The 
definition also should take into account dynamically changing financial 
markets and the different perspectives of policymakers and lawmakers, 
market participants and their lawyers, judges and regulators, and other 
members of the ―audience‖ affected by the definition. 
Based on these factors, I would initially define securitization as a 
financial transaction in which (1) a special purpose entity issues securities 
to investors and, directly or indirectly, uses the proceeds to purchase rights 
to, or expectations of, payment, and (2) collections on the rights or 
expectations so purchased constitute the primary source of repayment of 
those securities. To the extent the audience members consist of lawmakers, 
transactional lawyers, and market participants, I would add that the special 
purpose entity does not speculate in the rights to, or expectations of, 
payment that it purchases. I also would further modify the definition for the 
media and the public to make it more accessible.  
This audience-adaptive approach to defining securitization is proposed 
 
 79. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
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merely as a starting point. Some audiences may wish to make further 
refinements. Thus, in considering the amount of reserves that banks should 
be required to hold against investments in asset-backed securities, a 
regulator might wish to consider, among other factors, the extent to which 
the securitization transactions underlying those securities have legally 
isolated the payment risk from risks associated with the originators.81  
In advancing an audience-adaptive approach to defining securitization, 
I share Professor Lipson‘s caution—expressed regarding his own 
definition, but now I‘m applying that caution to mine—that it may not be 
―the best or only way to redefine securitization.‖82 Furthermore, I applaud 
and admire Professor Lipson‘s humility and intellectual integrity insofar as 
he offers his definition merely ―as a tool to organize the process of thinking 
about what securitization means, normatively.‖83 Thus, he would not 
expect his article to ―result in bank or securities regulators, who have 
generated the bulk of definitions regarding securitization, replacing their 
jargon with [his].‖84 In light of these qualifications, however, I find 
Lipson‘s reference to his definition as that of a ―true‖ securitization hard to 
square.85  
 
 81. Cf. supra Part I.B (arguing that a broad definition of securitization should not necessarily 
require the legal isolation that Lipson‘s definition requires). 
 82. Lipson, supra note 1, at 1235. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. I also find it hard to square the existence of a ―true‖ securitization, however defined, with the 
reality that what constitutes a securitization is at least partly market driven and partly judgmental. 
Lipson might have been inspired to adopt the term ―true‖ securitization from the concept of a ―true 
sale,‖ which often occurs in the intermediate structure of a securitization. A ―true sale,‖ however, 
describes something objective in law—a transfer of financial assets that removes those assets from the 
originator‘s bankruptcy estate under section 544 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. See SCHWARCZ, 
supra note 71, § 4:1, at 4–2 to 4–3 (discussing true sale under 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2006)).  
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